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Fittingly enough for the man who is 
credited with bringing Realpolitik to the 
rubes, Kissinger begins with a lengthy 
disquisition on the grand old european 
system of richelieu (“sophisticated 
and ruthless”) and Bismarck (“master 
manipulator of the balance of power”). 
while most of the world has had too 
much order (empires with universal 
claims) or too little (authorities inca-
pable of exercising control beyond the 
local level), europe for a time had the 
optimal order: mutually recognized 
sovereign states that enjoyed unchal-
lenged control over their own territo-
ries and pursued secular, defined goals 
through rational diplomacy and limited 
warfare. regrettably, the european 
system drove itself into the ground in 
the world wars, and that happened just 
before it was imperfectly established in 
the rest of the world during decoloniza-
tion. according to Kissinger, the chal-
lenge and tragedy of our times is that 
there is no international order, and “if 
order cannot be achieved by consensus 
or imposed by force, it will be wrought, 
at disastrous and dehumanizing cost, 
from the experience of chaos” (129). 
to those who have forgotten (or never 
took) their old-fashioned western Civ 
or international relations courses, all 
of this might sound rather profound, as 
might Kissinger’s observations about 
the essential characteristics of the differ-
ent parts of the world beyond europe: 
russia, ominously (or is it comi-
cally?) styling itself the third rome, 
combining “globe-spanning ambi-
tions” with “the insecurities of the par-
venu” (55). the Middle east supplies 
the “stern landscape [from which] have 
issued conquerors and prophets holding 
aloft banners of universal aspirations” 
(96). China is the Middle Kingdom, 
viewing itself as the center of a “univer-
sal hierarchy” (213). india, secure in its 
“timeless matrix,” measures the com-
ings and goings of empires and epochs 
“against the perspective of the infinite” 
(193). america is characterized by an 
irresistible combination of pragmatism 
and idealism.
Most of what Kissinger writes about the 
contemporary scene would be familiar 
to anyone who follows the news. His 
recommendations are also unremark-
able, although he does throw in bits 
of his trademark Machiavellianism 
(for example, he suggests dumping 
responsibility for afghanistan on that 
country’s neighbors). in recent years, 
Kissinger has positioned himself as the 
godfather (in the intellectual rather 
than the organized crime sense) of the 
‘realist’ school of foreign policy, which 
argues for restraint and against the 
militant interventionism of the neocon-
servative and ‘humanitarian’ factions. 
will the real Henry Kissinger 
Please Stand Up?
Leonid Heretz
Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2014).
Consider the design of the cover of Henry Kissinger’s most recent book. How many individuals’ names could stand up to a 
placement and juxtaposition like that?  thanks to 
half a century of promotion, Henry Kissinger’s 
can. Blurbs on the back of the book remind us of 
the author’s “intimate firsthand knowledge” of 
the high and mighty, his ability to offer “incisive 
strategic analysis” spanning continents and centuries 
and, not least, his role in shaping foreign policy and 
international relations. “no one can lay claim to so 
much inf luence … over the past 50 years,” according 
to the authoritative Financial Times.  it is no secret that 
Kissinger is getting on in years, so we might hope that 
World Order is his political testament, a place where he 
finally tells the inside story of why things are the way 
they are, and how they might be fixed. 
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Unfortunately, there is little of this 
Kissingerian realism in World Order, and 
most of the book reads like the op-ed 
pages of the Wall Street Journal or the 
Washington Post. this is particularly 
true of the treatment of america’s role. 
Kissinger raises hopes that he will offer 
a realist critique of U.S. policy when 
he gives woodrow wilson credit for 
bequeathing “to the twentieth centu-
ry’s decisive power an elevated foreign 
policy doctrine unmoored from a sense 
of history or geopolitics” (269). instead, 
he provides a reverent apology for suc-
cessive U.S. administrations, justifying 
virtually all of the major decisions made 
up to the invasions and occupations 
of afghanistan and iraq (but not the 
‘nation-building’ that followed), and 
showing that wilsonianism is actually 
a good thing because it has inspired 
americans to achieve even more than 
they would have otherwise. 
By way of consolation, the book is full 
of Kissingerian aphorisms struggling to 
be born. “For nations, history plays the 
role that character confers on human 
beings” (167) and “[i]n international 
affairs, a reputation for reliability is a 
more important asset than demonstra-
tions of tactical cleverness” (73) are just 
two of many. Kissinger was on tv a 
lot when i was a child, so i can see his 
deadpan expression and hear his grave 
monotone when i read “[H]istory pun-
ishes strategic frivolity sooner or later” 
(80). we are no longer in the realm of 
“Power is the greatest aphrodisiac,” 
but that would be a lot to expect of a 
91-year old.
inspired by this example, i will try 
my own hand at maxim-making: “a 
statesman is not a pedant.” World Order 
is shot through with sloppy quotation 
and even contains factual errors. to 
cite only two of them: first, Kissinger 
helps us appreciate the role of the Saudi 
king by likening it to that of the Holy 
roman emperor in his capacity as 
“defender of the Faith.” that honor-
ific belongs, of course, to the english 
monarch, and does not illuminate 
Middle eastern affairs in the slightest. 
elsewhere, we learn that eugene of 
Savoy led a european army that saved 
vienna and europe from the turks in 
1683. Prince eugene of Savoy, King 
Jan Sobieski of Poland—what differ-
ence does it make? the confusion is 
very roughly equivalent to saying that 
george Patton and not John Pershing 
led the american expeditionary Force 
to France in world war i. it would 
not matter that much if these were the 
memoirs of a practical politician who 
makes no pretense of intellectualism, 
but Kissinger bases his authority on  
a stereotypically Central european 
erudition and precision. 
another aphorism that suggests itself: 
“a statesman never plays it straight.”  
Kissinger gets very murky and unchar-
acteristically self-effacing when he 
comes to the nixon and Ford adminis-
trations, the only time when he  
actually had any power. this is  
how he deals with the invasion of 
Cambodia and the escalation of 
bombing in north vietnam (which 
are nowhere mentioned explicitly): 
“the military actions that President 
nixon ordered, and that as his national 
Security advisor i supported, together 
with the policy of diplomatic f lex-
ibility, brought about a settlement  
in 1973” (301). 
it would seem that Henry Kissinger is 
not yet ready to give up his secrets, at 
least not in a setting where an obscure 
college professor might get at them.
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